Multinationality and export intensity by Freitas, Ernesto
Thesis submitted in flilfihlment of the requirements for the award of a Masters Degree
in Economics from the Nova School of Business and Economics
Multinationality and Export Intensity
Emesto Freitas
Carried out under the supervision of Professor José Mata
Lisbon, 2013
1. INTRODUCTION
Exports are seen as having an important role in fostering economic growth and are a
subject of ongoing research interest. Research at the firm level has successfully linked
the prior productivity of finns to their decision to participate in export markets
(Bernard et al., 1995; Wagner, 2007). However, export market participation is only
the first step of a wider internationalization process that might lead to the
establishment of manufacturing subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid trade costs
associated with exports from the home country (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Dunning,
1980; Brainard, 1993). Thus, productivity might have a detrimental effect on export
growth for firms at later stages of their internationalization process, as these firms
choose to establish subsidiaries abroad. On the other hand, while high productivity
domestic firms might displace manufacturing abroad, countries also host subsidiaries
of foreign multinationals that account for a sizeable share of aggregate country
exports and follow a similar internationalization process.
We study the relationship between productivity and multinationality for domestic
firms, and between productivity and export behavior for purely domestic firms,
domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates of multinationals. We then compare the
results obtained with predictions from the literature on international trade with
heterogeneous firms. First, we examine how the international behavior of domestic
firms conforms to the predictions of the literature, concerning export market entry and
subsidiary establishment, as their productivity increases. Second, we examine whether
a negative relationship between productivity and export orientation of domestic
multinationals can be found, as an indication of the substitution of home exports with
subsidiary manufacturing. Third, we examine the relationship between productivity
and export orientation for foreign affiliates, discuss how they depend on the diverse
integration strategies of multinationals, and compare with findings for other countries.
Using recent data on firms operating in Portugal we find that domestic multinationals
and foreign affiliates of multinationals account for a very large share of aggregate
country exports. We find that, among domestic firms, firms with lower productivity
are focused on the domestic markel, firms with higher productivity export more, and
those with the highest productivity are multinationals. We find little support for a
negative relationship between productivity and export orientation for domestic
multinationals, and discuss how the absence of this relationship could result from
initial subsidiaries being established as non-manufacturing sales outposts. We find no
support for a direct relationship between productivity and export orientation of
foreign affiliates of multinationals, and discuss how the international integration
strategies of foreign affiliates, as determined by host country factors such as transport
and labor costs, might contribute to this result.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 High productivity firms become exporters
A persistent finding in the empirical literature on exports is that exporting firms are
larger and more productive than non-exporting firms (Wagner, 2007).
The literature has settled that the higher productivity of exporters is better explained
by the selection of high productivity of firms into exporting than by the existence of
accrued productivity benefits from exporting. In fact, the superior performance
characteristics of exporting firms have been found to precede exporting status of firms
by several years (Bernard & Jensen, 1999), and there is no significant empirical
support for additional performance benefits to exporters due to the export activity
itself (Clerides et al., 1998).
The existence of productivity requirements for exporting is expected, as exporting
requires that firms bear additional costs relative to domestic activity. Entry in export
markets requires that firms bear fixed costs of entry associated with the establishment
of distribution or service networks, workforce training or product compliance
(Baldwin, 1988). While some of these costs may be sunk, continued operation in
export markets requires that firms permanently incur in transport costs and thus
remain high productivity firms.
2.2 High productivity firms also become multinationals
Multinationals must be high productivity firms, as they bear high fixed costs of FDI
and must possess firm-specific advantages to overcome the costs of operating in a
foreign country (Dunning, 1980).
Multinational firms can be expected to have high productivity due to existence of
intangible firm-specific assets. The decision to become a multinational firm has been
derived as the optimal mode of serving a foreign market, as opposed to resorting to
licensing agreements or exporting, when firms attempt to prevent the dissipation of
proprietary knowledge-based assets (Ethier & Markusen, 1991). The multinational
firm is then viewed as a network of affiliates with access to firm-specific assets, that
are related to expertise in engineering, management or marketing (Horstmann &
Markusen, 1987), and which are available inside the multinational firm as public
goods.
The decision to become a multinational firm has also been derived as the result of
high productivity firms choosing to spread their production internationally.
International organization of production allows multinationals to exploit scale
economies and international factor price differentials (Dunning, 1993). However, only
firms with sufficiently low variable costs of production will try to attain those cost
related advantages and become multinationals (Grossman et al., 2006).
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2.3 Multinational firms have a heterogeneous exporting behavior in home and host
countries
Multinational firms establish subsidiaries in host countries partly to prevent the
transport costs associated with international trade between home and host countries
(Brainard, 1993). In fact, the majority of foreign affiliates have a predominantly
domestic market oriented activity (Kneller & Pisu, 2004). Consequently, this strategy
precludes an important exporting behavior for the multinational in either the home or
host country.
On the other hand, some multinational firms establish exporting affiliates abroad.
Noting a growing importance of intra-firm trade, Hanson et al. (2005) show that
multinationals organized in vertical production networks place labor-intensive input-
processing activities in low-wage countries, thus leading to the establishment of
exporting subsidiaries abroad and linking the establishment motive with low labor
costs.
The establishment of exporting affiliates is not restricted to vertically integrated
multinational firms. Export platform production, where multinational firms establish
manufacturing affiliates abroad in order to export to third countries or to the home
country, is also an empirically important outcome as found by Hanson et al. (2005).
Export platform production in low-cost low-demand countries has been derived as an
optimal multinational location strategy to serve demand in a free-trade area such as
the EU or the NAFTA. This strategy allows for the large scale economies associated
with production in a single plant inside a larger regional bloc to serve its demand,
while holding the ability to exploit factor price differentials (Ekholm et al., 2007).
Thus, some foreign affiliates have an exporting activity in the host country, although
most foreign affiliates are not expected to. This exporting activity of foreign affiliates
in host countries can be justified with concentration of production to achieve scale
economies or intermediate production to draw from favorable factor price
differentials. Multinational exporting behavior at the home country is left
undetermined for the abovementioned strategies. While multinationals are always
expected to maintain headquarter services in the home country, whether they displace
manufacturing activities from the home country to host countries is dependent on the
overall motives for establishing subsidiaries.
2.4 Higher productivity allows exporters to become multinationals
Firms follow a gradual internationalization process that starts with ad hoc exporting
and deals with intermediaries in foreign markets, and may progress until the
establishment of subsidiaries, first as sales organizations, and later on as local
manufacturers (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Progress along internationalization stages
necessarily alters the exporting role for the multinational firm at home. In particular,
if firms establish manufacturing subsidiaries abroad, it may be in substitution of home
exports, although the effect of subsidiary establishment on home export behavior is
ambiguous as subsidiaries may be established as non-manufacturing sales outposts
that may be used as distribution networks in order to increase home exports.
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Progress over the various internationalization stages requires, however, that firms
overcome several productivity hurdles, as discussed earlier. In fact, international trade
models usually model FIN and international trade decisions of firms as linked and
dependent on the learned productivity of individual finns. The derived outcome is
that, low productivity firms operate in domestic markets, as they cannot profitably
incur in the additional transport and trading costs of export markets, and high-
productivity firms participate in foreign markets, with the most productive among
these opting to serve foreign markets with manufacturing in the host country, as FDI
is more costly than exporting (Helpman et al., 2003).
The literature on heterogeneous firms and international trade also relates firms’
learned productivity with their international trade decisions in settings were firms face
richer integration choices, namely, when firms are able to conduct one or more stages
of production internationally. Grossman et al. (2006) show that, in the absence of
transport costs, an assumption that invalidates horizontal location motives for
multinationals, firms might still locate in a low-demand low-wage country as part of
an export platform or vertical FDI strategy. As in the previous case, only sufficiently
high productivity firms can incur the fixed costs of any manufacturing FDI activity, as
these firms are granted larger savings in variable costs associated with production in
the low-wage low-demand country. Firms with insufficiently high productivity must
remain in home production and resort to exports to serve foreign markets (Grossman
et al., 2006).
Productivity is a key determinant of firms’ optimal international integration strategy.
An increase in productivity for high productivity exporting firms might lead them to
establish manufacturing subsidiaries abroad. Thus, for sufficiently high productivity
firms, in contrast to the effect found at earlier stages of export activity, frirther
increases in productivity might have a negative effect on home exports due to a partial
or complete displacement of exports through the shift of manufacturing abroad.
2.5 The impact of productivity on the home country export behavior of multinationals
varies with firms’ productivity level
The impact of multinationality on home export behavior depends on the type of
subsidiaries that are established in host countries. Establishment of manufacturing
subsidiaries is expected to have a negative impact in home export behavior, as
subsidiary establishment has mostly horizontal motives (Brainard, 1993). However,
firms also establish non-manufacturing subsidiaries, as part of firms’ distribution
networks, which should have a positive effect on home country export behavior.
The establishment of non-manufacturing subsidiaries is sometimes the first stage
leading to the establishment of manufacturing subsidiaries. It has been found that
some firms establish subsidiaries in the host country as part of their distribution
network and then gradually increase the number of manufacturing stages performed at
the subsidiary (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). If the initial subsidiary establishment is
done as an effort to enhance the firm’s distribution network, we expect initial
productivity increases to translate into higher home country export intensity for
multinational firms.
5
Multinational firms that choose to initiate manufacturing activities in substitution of
distribution network subsidiaries are likely to have higher productivity than those that
choose not to. In fact, when firms choose between establishing more plants with the
associated higher fixed costs, or less plants and distribution networks with associated
lower fixed costs but higher variable costs, only the most productive firms choose the
first option, as more productive firms are more likely to try to minimize variable costs
of operation (Lu et al., 2010).
Thus, while initial productivity increases might be expected to lead firms to establish
non-manufacturing subsidiaries and lead to an improvement in the home market
export performance of multinationals, we expect that further increases eventually
result in the establishment of manufacturing subsidiaries that can lead firms to at least
partially withdraw from home market exports.
2.6 The relationship between productivity and export intensity of foreign affiliates is
undetermined at the outset.
Most of the previous discussion addresses how the establishment of subsidiaries
might influence firms’ export behavior in the home country, under the assumption
that most multinationals establish manufacturing affiliates for horizontal motives.
While this motive might be valid for most firms (Brainard, 1993), particularly at the
early stages of the internationalization process that were discussed (Johanson &
Vahlne, 1977), it does not foresee any exporting role for foreign affiliates on host
countries and thus cannot explain the disproportionate share of country exports held
by foreign affiliates (Kneller & Pisu, 2004).
The abovementioned vertical integration and export platform strategies explain the
exporting behavior for foreign affiliates. Concentration of final or intermediate
production in a single country leads to the prediction of a positive relationship
between productivity and export intensity, as the higher production levels of the more
productive firms cannot be fulfilled with production in alternative plants as is the case
of horizontally integrated multinationals.
However, contrary to this hypothesis, Lu et al. (2010) find that, in China, exporting
foreign affiliates are less productive than non-exporting foreign affiliates. The authors
develop a model similar to the model developed by Grossman et al. (2006) to
illustrate how a negative relationship between productivity and the export status of
foreign affiliates can be derived, if firms choose between establishing individual
plants to serve local markets and establishing a single plant with distribution networks
to serve both the local market and markets abroad. As discussed earlier, in this setting
non-exporting foreign affiliates are required to have a higher productivity, in order to
bear the higher fixed costs associated with establishing individual plants over
establishing distribution networks.
Unlike domestic firms, the firms now considered are at a more advanced
internationalization stage, since they are productive enough to establish
manufacturing subsidiaries abroad, but face a choice between an export platform
strategy that concentrates production in a single country and a horizontal integration
strategy that disperses production in independent countries. The selection of higher
productivity foreign affiliates into local manufacturing is driven by a change in the
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optimal integration strategy from export platform production to local production in
independent locations when productivity is sufficiently high. This argument would
predict, for instance, that some high productivity firms would eventually displace
activities from low-cost host countries to their home countries when faced with
positive productivity shocks, which might be an empirically relevant result (Sirkin et
al., 2012).
However, the result found by Lu et al. (2010) could be dependent on the setting
considered. In fact, the result is driven under the assumption of a large domestic
demand, both theoretically and in the empirical setting. If domestic demand is low,
the productivity threshold to make firms abandon an export platform strategy in favor
of local production should be higher. Thus, a Low domestic demand could be
insufficient to drive a large number of high productivity firms to establish local
manufacturing plants to the point of inducing a significantly negative relationship
between productivity and export status for foreign affiliates. Additionally, if the low
demand country is located inside a large free-trade region with low transport costs
with neighboring countries, these costs subsequently reduce the value of exclusively
local production and make it less likely to occur. While multinationals might take the
larger regional market as the relevant market, and consider installing manufacturing
plants at a regional level to substitute distribution networks, this might still not have a
visible effect in the export intensity of the local affiliate if the affiliate is accustomed
to supply neighboring markets, and thus not contributing to induce a negative
relationship between productivity and export intensity.
A low-demand low-wage country located inside a larger regional free trade area is an
important setting to test the relationship between productivity and export intensity of
foreign affiliates, as countries with this profile have been conjectured to be the most
likely recipients of export platform motivated FDI (Ekholm et al., 2007).
3. DATA AND METHODS
3.1 Data
We use data from the SABI dataset which is provided by Bureau van Dijk, and whose
primary source in Portugal is “InformaçAo Empresarial Simplificada”, a mandatory
yearly survey conducted by administrative entities. Almost the whole population of
Portuguese firms is required to hand in these surveys, although some legal forms are
exempted, mostly non-profit or unlimited liability organizations. The information
collected contains balance sheet and income statement data, including information on
export activity for recent years.
Firms are also required to provide ownership information, including shareholder and
subsidiary stakes along with the country of origin or destination of these stakes.
Bureau van Dijk combines this ownership information with exhaustive ownership
information collected from firms’ public reports on an international basis, in an effort
to identify the ultimate shareholder of the firm and its nationality by following all
known majority shareholder upstream links for the firm.
Unfortunately we are only provided with the ownership information at the date of data
collection, and are not able to identify ownership changes, although we expect firm
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ownership data to be stable. We use information on the nationality of the ultimate
shareholder of the firm to assign foreign status to firms, and are also able to identify
domestic multinationals, defined as domestic firms that report established subsidiaries
abroad.
We have access to a panel of firms operating in Portugal from 2008 until 2011, from
which we select firms whose primary activity is in manufacturing, and thus classified
within ISIC Rev. 4 codes 10 to 33. We restrict our analysis to manufacturing firms, as
our earlier discussion does not conform to the determinants of exports and subsidiary
establishment decisions of firms operating in the services or in the primary sector.
Industry classification data is also only available at the date of data collection,
although we also expect that it is not a significant source of error, as we do not expect
that many firms change their main industry during the short time span of the data.
Additionally, we drop firms with missing values for any of the following variables:
fixed assets, number of employees and added value. In order to comply with the
requirements of our estimation procedures, we also drop a small number of firms with
negative va!ues for added value and firms operating in three-digit ISIC sectors with
less than 10 finns in total. Finally, due to irregular coverage of data, we use a constant
sample of firms that are observed in every year of the panel and satisfy all of the
cleaning procedures described above.
Our final sample includes 15,580 purely domestic firms (henceforth referred to as
“domestic firms”), 100 domestic multinationals and 209 foreign firms. All nominal
variables are deflated with the GDP price deflator and reported at 2011 prices.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
We follow a two-step approach. First, we estimate input coefficients of Cobb-Douglas
production functions separately for each individual industry, in order to obtain total
factor productivity (TFP) estimates for individual firms. Second, for each firm
ownership type, we regress firm export orientation on firm productivity, using the
estimates of firm productivity obtained in the first step.
3.2.1 Production Function Estimation
To obtain TFP estimates for individual firms we estimate several specifications of the
following equation:
Yit = Uo + $1 it + flkkft + Wft + fl
where Yit is the logarithm of value added, used to measure of firm output, and l and
are the logarithm of labor and capital, respectively. The error term is assumed
separable into Wft, a productivity component and mt’ an i.i.d component.
Estimation of the previous equation presents several challenges. The first problem is
the simultaneity of input choice. If firms with higher productivity choose higher input
levels, then productivity and input usage will be positively correlated and the OLS
estimator will be biased upwards for both input coefficients.
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We could also have a selection bias. If firms find capital inputs harder to adjust than
labor inputs, negative productivity shocks are less likely to lead to firm exit in firms
with higher levels of capital. This effect would generate a downwards bias in the OLS
estimator of the capital coefficient (Van Beveren, 2012). However, selection bias is
found to be much less important empirically than the simuLtaneity bias (Levinsohn &
Petrin, 2003)
There are several alternatives to overcome these problems. The procedures introduced
by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) are frequently used and
make use of assumptions on the timing and dynamics of input usage and TFP, as well
as the relationship between inputs and TFP, in order to obtain semi-parametric
estimators that are consistent in the presence of a simultaneity bias and even for the
less severe selection bias effect in the case of the first procedure.
A less structural approach is to use a fixed effects estimator (Pavcnik, 2002;
Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003; Eberhardt & Helmers, 2010). The fixed effects estimator
will provide consistent estimates for input coefficients under the assumption that w
is firm specific but time invariant, that is, assuming w1 V, which would be
unreasonable if firms had time to adjust inputs to their realized productivity. As the
fixed effects estimator only uses within firm variation, it is not subject to the
simultaneity bias. Assumption of time-invariant fixed effects for firms rules out the
selection bias from exit that is due to the realization of low productivity shocks by
assumption.
However, fixed effects estimation may be appropriate to our setting. The assumption
of time invariant fixed effects may be suited to our short panel. Also, the time period
used in out panel provides particularly high within firm variation, thus minimizing the
downfall of only using within firm variation instead of cross section variation.
Accordingly, we perform fixed effects regressions by each manufacturing sector in
our panel, both using two-digit and three-digit [SIC sectors. For comparison purposes,
we also perform equivalent OLS regressions for each manufacturing sector in our
panel.
3.2.2 Export Intensity Regressions
After obtaining TFP estimates, we estimate several specifications of the following
equation with OLS regressions:
E11 = DOMX(fl1?OM + PDOMTFP ) + DMNEXgMNE + $fIMNETFPIC) +
+ FORXCGtOR + PFORTFP ) + Ylt + Eft
where EIt is firm export intensity, the share of firm output that is exported, DOM,
DMNE and FOR are dummies for firm ownership type, indicating whether the firm is
a domestic firm, a domestic multinational or a foreign affiliate. YIt stands for a set of
common control variables which include, according to specification, 4 year dummies,




Table 1 presents aggregate values for performance and input variables in 2011 for our
sample. Aggregate value added in our sample is roughly 4% of the GDP of Portugal,
which was 185 billion euros in 2011. This low percentage is due to the restriction to
manufacturing sectors only, as manufacturing only accounts for about l3% of the
GDP in Portugal (World Bank data for 2010; data not available for 2011, but with
overall decreasing trend). However, finns in our sample account for a stable share of
about 30% of total Portuguese exports in the sample period, as can be seen in Table 2.
We can also observe in Table 1 that domestic multinationals account for around 10%
of aggregate sample values in assets, sales, exports and value added, and a
substantially smaller share of the number of employees. Foreign affiliates account for
around 20% of aggregate assets, value added and sales in our sample, and also
account for a substantially smaller share of employees. Nevertheless, foreign affiliates
are responsible for a very large share of exports, particularly EU exports as they
account for 40% of EU exports in our sample.
Table 3 displays the distribution of firms by each two-digit ISIC Industry. The
aggregate number of firms is around 15,000, which compares to a population of
around 38,000 manufacturing firms (data from Statistics Portugal). Thus we are able
to account for around 30% of manufacturing output and 40% of the number of finns.
Although these shares are imprecise, they may indicate an overrepresentation of
smaller finns in our sample. Both domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates seem
to be moderately well distributed across sectors, although the distribution of domestic
multinationals seem to follow more closely that of domestic firms.
Table 4 displays averages of key variables in our sample by firm ownership type. The
distribution of some of these variables is depicted in Figure 1. Variables that are
directly related with input use such as assets, fixed assets, number of employees, labor
costs, skill and labor productivity, are all similar among domestic multinationals and
foreign affiliates, although the similarity is smaller for labor related variables, as
foreign affiliates seem to hire less but more skilled workers, when compared to
domestic multinationals. For any of these variables, foreign affiliates and domestic
multinationals have significantly higher average values than domestic firms. Figure 1
illustrates how the distributions of input usage variables and performance variables
are similar among domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates, and dissimilar
between domestic firms and either domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates. In
spite of this similarity, the distributions of input usage and performance variables of
foreign affiliates are more left skewed and exhibit higher dispersion than the
distributions of domestic multinationals.
Foreign affiliates export considerably more than domestic multinationals, although
they are not located in industries with higher levels of export orientation and a higher
percentage of domestic multinationals are exporters. Foreign affiliate export intensity
is more polarized than that of domestic multinationals, as most foreign affiliates either
export most of their production or a small amount of their total production, in contrast
with a much more even distribution of domestic multinational firms over export
intensity. This helps us understand the relative left skew of the distribution of
characteristics for foreign affiliates relative to that of domestic multinationals, as an
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important number of foreign affiliates are domestic market oriented and thus can
operate at a smaller scale than domestic multinationals. Foreign affiliate exports are
more EU market oriented than those of domestic multinationals, and the latter group
of firms seems to perform better than foreign affiliates in non EU markets, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Domestic firms have a poorer export performance than any
other group of firms, with lower exports, a low percentage of exporters and low
export intensity among exporters.
Table 5 and 6 present estimates for input coefficients obtained with a set of pooled
OLS regressions by both two and three digit industries. As discussed above, the
output variable used is deflated value added. The labor input variable used is the
number of employees and the capital input variable is deflated fixed assets. Average
coefficients for Labor and capital are similar in the two-digit or three-digit industry
specifications. In the case of a two-digit industry specification, the average capital
input coefficient is 0.92 and the average labor input coefficient is 0.15. Average sum
of coefficients is 1.08, in favor of returns to scale, with almost no sector reporting
negative returns to scale. In the latter case of a three-digit industry specification, the
average capital input coefficient is slightly higher at 0.94 and the average labor input
coefficient is slightly smaller at 0.14. Average sum of coefficients is still 1.08, again
in favor of returns to scale for almost all sectors.
In Table 7 and 8 we report the input coefficients obtained using a fixed effects
estimator (within). As expected from the existence of a simultaneity bias leading to an
upward bias in OLS estimates, there is a drop in average input coefficient estimates
for both input types. In the two-digit case, the average labor input coefficient is now
0.61 and the average capital input coefficient is 0.07, with an average sum of
coefficients of 0.68, in favor of decreasing returns to scale, although two sectors still
exhibit increasing returns to scale and the overall distribution of the sum of
coefficients is larger. In the three-digit case, average labor input coefficient, average
capital input coefficient and average coefficient sum are all the same as in the two-
digit case.
The capital input coefficient appears to be small, although these input coefficient
estimates are similar to those generally found performing fixed effects estimations
with value added as the output variable. In particular, Eberhardt and Helmers (2010)
find fixed effects estimation to hold a capital input coefficient of around 0.2,
sometimes near 0.1, depending on specification. Additionally, fixed assets are
generally 25% to 30% of total assets (Table 1). Total assets include intangible assets,
which are one the discussed sources of firm productivity, and thus should be
excluded. If we were to include total assets as our capital input variable and perform
fixed effects regressions we would obtain input coefficients of 0.53 for both labor and
capital at the two-digit level and 0.52 and 0.50 for labor and capital, respectively, at
the three-digit level (not reported).
In Figure 2 we plot the distribution of TFP estimates according to these 4
specifications and firm ownership type. The distribution of TFP estimates obtained
\vith pooLed OLS estimations at the two-digit or three-digit industry level appear to be
unreasonably different from the distributions of any performance related variables in
Figure 1. On the other hand, either of the two distributions obtained under fixed effect
estimations seems to agree with the overall shape of performance variables in Figure
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1. As the pooled OLS estimator results in larger estimates for the capital and labor
input coefficients, groups of firms with higher productivity and input usage will have
more of their performance attributed to the higher input usage, resulting in smaller
productivity residuals than in the fixed effect estimation case and smaller differences
in estimated productivity across firm ownership groups. As can be seen in Table 9,
TFP estimates according to a two or three digit industry level are also highly
correlated for any chosen estimator and do not seem to hold considerable differences,
although less so in the fixed effects case.
Table II reports the distribution of firm TFP estimates for our preferred specification
of fixed effects regression at the three-digit level, by firm ownership type. It illustrates
the similarity in the distribution of TFP estimates for foreign affiliates and domestic
multinationals, a higher overall productivity of firms in any of these two groups
relative to domestic firms, and also a slightly higher dispersion of productivity of
foreign affiliates relative to domestic multinationals. At the last two classes of TFP
estimates, we find only 0.4% of domestic firms, but 15% of domestic multinationals
and 16.3% of foreign affiliates.
Figure 3 depicts how the TFP of firms of any ownership type increases as firms age.
Accordingly, the slope of the lines fitted for any firm ownership type is always
positive. This result is consistent with gradual productivity increases over time and
can justi1’ firms’ gradual progress over internationalization stages (Johanson &
Vahlne, 1977).
Figure 4 depicts a non-parametric local polynomial regression of export intensity on
TFP estimates by firm ownership type. Domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates
share overall similar levels of productivity, that are much higher than those for
domestic firms. Domestic firms exhibit a positive relationship between productivity
and export intensity. For foreign affiliates the relationship between productivity and
export intensity appears to be negative, while for domestic multinationals the
relationship between productivity and export intensity appears to be mostly flat, but
negative for very high productivity levels.
We now turn to the second stage estimation results. Table 12 displays the results of
this estimation procedure in 4 different specifications. Export intensity is measured in
percentage points. The first two specifications are performed with no additional
control variables, while the last two specifications include three sets of dummy
variables, including year dummies, location dummies and the district level, and
industry sector dummies at the three-digit level. Specifications (1) and (3) include
different intercepts and linear terms for each firm ownership type, while
specifications (2) and (4) also include one quadratic term on productivity in order to
allow for a non-linear effect of productivity on firm export intensity. Reported t
statistics are computed with robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level.
The specification in column (I) shows that foreign affiliates and domestic
multinationals alike are much more export oriented than domestic firms. Both firm
ownership dummies are above 50 percentage points, and thus we expect multinational
firms of any type to export more than half of their output. We are not able to reject the
null hypothesis that the dummies for foreign affiliate and domestic multinational are
equal (p-value = 0.733). However, their response to an increase in productivity is
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different. While foreign affiliates exhibit a negative effect of productivity on export
intensity, the effect of productivity on export intensity for domestic multinationals is
not significant (p-value 0=0.943). Domestic firms, on the other hand, have an
intercept of 12.6 percentage points, much lower than the intercepts of other ownership
types, but a higher effect from productivity increases. Although the effect is strong
enough to generate the predicted negative export intensity values for the range of
productivity estimates for domestic firms in our sample, the threshold value is very
low at -1.05, and thus it only occurs for a small group of firms (Table 10).
The specification in column (2) includes a quadratic term in productivity for every
firm ownership type. All dummy coefficients seem similar to the estimates in
specification (I). Again, we are unable reject the null hypothesis of equality of
dummy coefficients for foreign affiliates and domestic multinationals. Domestic firms
exhibit a significant linear coefficient estimate, which is similar in magnitude to the
one found in specification (1), but also exhibits a positive and significant estimated
coefficient for the quadratic term. The linear and quadratic coefficients for foreign
affiliates are both negative, but no longer significant individually, although the p
value for the test ofjoint significance of both coefficients is only 0.0503. Both the
linear and quadratic coefficients for domestic multinationals are significant, but it is
the only firm ownership type with estimated coefficients of different signs. Thus, the
linear term is positive and the quadratic term is negative, thus implying initial positive
effects of productivity on export intensity, but subsequent increases with diminishing
positive effects. The coefficient estimates imply negative marginal effects of TFP
from level 1.93 of TFP onwards, a region where 15% of domestic multinationals are
located.
As discussed earlier, specifications (3) and (4) contain estimation results from OLS
regressions that include sets of year, location and industry dummies as control
variables. The results obtained are similar to those in specifications (I) and (2). Due
to the inclusion of control variables, only differences in ownership dummies remain
interpretable, not individual ownership dummy levels. We continue to fail to reject
the null hypothesis of equality between the foreign affiliate dummy and the domestic
multinational dummy, and these remain higher than the domestic dummy. In
specification (3) all Linear coefficients have the same sign and the magnitude only
decreases considerably for domestic multinationals, while remaining not significant,
relative to specification (I). The only change in significance levels is that the linear
coefficient for foreign affiliates is no longer significant (p-value of 0.148).
Specification (4) also holds similar results to specification (2). Tn particular, we are
unable to reject the null hypothesis that ownership dummies for domestic
multinationals and foreign affiliates are equal. Linear and quadratic coefficients for
domestic firms are similar to specification (2). The sign and lack of significance for
the linear and quadratic terms for foreign affiliates are also similar to specification
(2), although it is even harder to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are
jointly significant (p-value = 0.3645). For the linear and quadratic terms of domestic
multinationals we have the same magnitude, sign and significance as in specification
(2). The coefficient estimates for the linear an quadratic terms of domestic
multinationals now imply negative marginal effects of TFP from level 2.44 of TFP
onwards, a region where only 6% of domestic multinationals are located.
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Table 12. OLS Regressions of Export Intensity
(in percentage_points)
(1) (2)
Note: p<O.O1, ** p<O.O5, * p<O.l. t-statistics in parenthesis
A robustness check is performed to ensure that the choice of a linear probability
model does not influence results in the presence of a fractional dependent variable
that is bounded to the unit interval. We follow Papke and Wooldddge (1993) in using
a method that combines the usual logistic transformation of the dependent variable
with a binomial distribution, in order to allow the dependent variable to take extreme
values of zero or one (nor reported). For the subsets of firms that we are mostly
interested, namely domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates, the only change in
significance for the interaction terms with productivity is that the linear term for
domestic multinationals in the equivalent specification to specification (3) is now
significant, although still positive, which is still in agreement with our results. All
significant productivity interaction terms have the same sign as before. Robustness of
results for these groups of firms is expected as they have non extreme export intensity
values, as seen in Figure 4. However, as Figure 4 illustrates, domestic firms have
some extreme values near to zero, and thus we expect that the convexity could be
partially induced by the imposition of a linear probability model. Accordingly, the
quadratic terms for domestic firms are negative in this regression. Thus we should
interpret the quadratic term for domestic firms with caution when using the simpler
and more easily interpretable linear probability model, although and we expect no
bias in our results for the groups of multinational firms.
Dependent Variable: Export Intensity
(3) (4)
Domestic 12.608*** ll.686*** -2.031
(65.893) (52.806) (-1.306) (-2.118)
Domestic X TFP I l.969c I l.912*** 12.357*** 12.236***
(34.119) (34.059) (37.914) (37.990)
Domestic X TFP2 2.29 l*** 2.802***
(6.509) (8.518)
Foreign 53•453*** 52.757*** 33.25 l*** 33.149***
(12.641) (11.073) (7.690) (6.811)
Foreign X TFP 5•534** -3.662 -3.600 -2.943
(-2.080) (-0.686) (-1.447) (-0.569)
Foreign X TFP2 -0.666 -0.053
(-0.496) (-0.042)
DMNE 51.409*** 47445*** 3l.l97*** 26.797***
(12.090) (11.140) (6.821) (5.235)
DMNE X TFP 0.185 6.918* 1.065 7.832*
(0.072) (1.750) (0.423) (1.760)
DMNEXTFP2 j7gg*** .1.606**
(-2.919) (-2.307)
Inthisny Dummies NO NO YES YES
Location Dummies NO NO YES YES
Year Dummies NO NO YES YES
Number of observations 63,556 63,556 63,556 63,556
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Our results suggest that, unconditional on productivity levels, domestic multinationals
and foreign affiliates do not have significantly different export intensity levels, which
stresses the importance of multinationality status for export performance, irrespective
of the type of established subsidiaries. Hence, domestic multinationals and foreign
affiliates alike seem to eKport at least a share of 30% of their output more than
domestic firms, even if we control for industry, year and location.
However, the effect on an increase in productivity is different for domestic
multinationals and foreign affiliates. The effect of productivity on the export intensity
of domestic multinationals is initially positive and later on negative, as expected.
Nevertheless, the threshold productivity level required to induce a negative marginal
effect of productivity on export intensity of domestic multinationals is very high and
thus unlikely to affect a significant number of domestic multinationals. These results
are coherent with initially established subsidiaries performing a non-manufacturing
distribution role, while subsequent subsidiaries may perform manufacturing roles.
Although this effect does not seem to be very large, it is large enough to break down
the overall positive association between productivity and export intensity. However,
we cannot account for how much our particular setting influences the result, as a low
domestic demand might encourage the establishment of distribution networks and low
labor prices can deter transfer of manufacturing to subsidiaries abroad.
The international involvement of domestic firms according to their productivity level
seems to be as follows: low productivity domestic finns are focused on the domestic
market; the most productive domestic firms are exporters; the highest productivity
domestic firms are multinationals. This results holds before and after controlling for
industry, year and location and is consistent the predictions of the literature.
The productivity of foreign affiliates does not seem to have a significant effect on
their export intensity, after industry, year and location are accounted for. Although the
coefficient for the productivity variable is negative and significant before addition of
control variables, and remains negative in specifications (3) and (4), we fail to reject
the hypothesis that there is no effect of productivity on the export intensity of foreign
affiliates in both specifications (3) and (4). Thus, we cannot reject the negative effect
of productivity on export intensity of foreign affiliates, as found in Lu et al. (2010).
While the persistently negative sign of the coefficients on productivity may suggest
that the failure to find a negative relationship is due to a lower sample size than the
one used in Lu et al. (2010), in particular since a clear relationship exists for domestic
multinationals which constitute a smaller group of firms, it is consistent with the
findings of other studies. It has been found that the export intensity of foreign
affiliates in the United Kingdom is similarly unresponsive to individual firm
characteristics when compared to domestic finns (Kneller & Pisu, 2004). This finding
has been taken as evidence of the existence of complex integration strategies of
multinationals whose strategic decisions are not explained in a linear fashion by firm
characteristics, which is in agreement with our hypothesis that a low-demand low




We studied the relationship between productivity and international participation of
purely domestic firms, domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates of
multinationals. We have found a direct relationship between domestic firms’
productivity and both export intensity and muttinationalitv, with the hierarchy
predicted by the international trade literature, that is, low productivity domestic firms
are domestic market oriented, higher productivity domestic firms export more, and the
highest productivity domestic firms are multinationals.
We have found that multinationals as a whole make up for a very important share of
exports and that the impact of productivity on the export intensity of multinational
firms is different from that of purely domestic firms and thus firms’ multinationality
status is important in assessing export behavior. Among multinational firms, domestic
multinationals and foreign affiliates also respond differently to productivity, although
they share similar characteristics and an overall similar level of export orientation.
We have found that domestic multinationals do not exhibit a negative relationship
between export orientation and productivity, unlike what could be expected from the
FDI literature. A possible explanation for this finding is the importance of the
establishment of subsidiaries as sales outposts at an intermediate internationalization
stage, as documented in the business literature.
We were not able to find a direct relationship between productivity and export
intensity for foreign affiliates. Although we cannot reject the negative relationship
that is found in other studies, this is evidence of a larger heterogeneity within foreign
affiliates, as domestic multinationals have a clear relationship between productivity
and export intensity, while constituting a smaller group of firms. The heterogeneity of
foreign affiliates may be related to host country characteristics, as export platform and
vertical integration strategies are more likely to be pursued by multinationals in low
demand low-wage countries. Thus, identification of the pursued integration strategies
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Aggregate Values for 2011
Ownership Type
DOM DMNE FOR Total
Assets (€ ‘000 000) 30,177 71% 4,493 11% 7,900 19% 42,570
Fixed Assets (€ ‘000 000) 8,986 73% 1,054 9% 2,243 18% 12,283
No. Employees 320,875 83% 23,835 6% 40,680 11% 385,390
Sales (€ ‘000 000) 28,672 66% 4,140 9% 10,831 23% 43,642
Exports(€ ‘000000) 10,158 549 1,844 10% 6,871 36% 18,873
EU Exports (E ‘000 000) 8,222 52% 1,301 8% 6,237 40% 15,761
Value Added (€ ‘000 000) 7,867 73% 874 8% 2,104 19% 10.844
Table 2. Aggregate Exports by year (Millions of Euros)
Ownership Type
Exports DOM DMNE FOR Sample Total Portugal Sample
2008 8,892 1,646 5,769 16,307 59,144 27.6%
2009 7,828 1,577 4,793 14,198 49,311 28.8%
2010 8,800 1,694 6,102 16,595 55,577 29.9%
2011 10,158 1,844 6,871 18,873 62,232 30.3%
Note: Portuguese Exports include non-manufacturing exports
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Table 3: Distribution of Firms by Industry and Firm Ownership Type
Ownership Type
ISIC Rev.4 - two digits DOM DMNE FOR Total
No. No. No. No.
10- Manufacture of food products 2,030 13 23 2,066
11 - Manufacture of beverages 194 3 5 202
13- Manufacture of textiles 824 7 10 841
14- Manufacture ofwearing apparel 1,498 10 4 1,512
15-Manufacture of leather 850 3 6 859
16 - Manufacture of products of wood and cork 1,094 5 6 1,105
17- Manufacture of paper products 179 3 8 190
18 - Printing and reproduction of recorded media 810 2 0 812
20- Manufacture of chemical products 235 2 22 259
21 - Manufacture of pharmaceutical products 31 2 6 39
22- Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 472 5 12 489
23- Manufacture non-metallic mineral products 1,076 5 18 1,099
24- Manufacture of basic metals 117 1 7 125
25- Manufacture of fabricated metal products 2,985 19 18 3,022
26 - Manufacture of electronic products 70 1 5 76
27 - Manufacture of electrical equipment 212 5 11 228
28- Manufacture of machinery and equipment 566 9 8 583
29 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers 179 1 29 209
30- Manufacture of other transport equipment 49 0 0 49
31 - Manufacture of furniture 920 3 1 924
32 - Other manufacturing 508 0 5 513
33 - Repair and installation of machinery 681 1 5 687
Total 15,580 100 209 15,889
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Table 4: Summary Statistics (2008-2011)
Ownership Type
averages DOM DMNE FOR Total
Sales (€ ‘000 000) 1.8 39.9 47.0 2.6
Valued Added (E ‘000 000) 0.5 9.0 10.0 0.7
Assets (Q ‘000 000) 1.9 42.6 38.3 2.6
Fixed Assets (€ ‘000 000) 0.6 10.3 11.3 0.8
No. Employees 20.5 234.7 199.0 24.2
Labor Costs (€ ‘000 000) 0.3 4.8 5.2 0.4
Skill (Cost per Worker, € ‘000) 13.5 20.8 27.4 13.8
Labor Productivity (VA per Worker, € ‘000) 21.2 40.2 55.0 21.7
Exports (€ ‘000 000) 0.6 16.9 28.2 1.0
Exporter Dummy 0.429 0.985 0.891 0.438
Exports as Share of Output 0.123 0.516 0.470 0.130
EU Exports as Share of Exports 0.779 0.709 0.834 0.780
Sector Exports as Share of 2D Sector Output 0.368 0.38 1 0.403 0.369
Sector Exports as Share of 3D Sector Output 0.352 0.4 19 0.409 0.353
Export Intensity Classes
0% 0.571 0.015 0.109 0.562
>0 - 20% 0.248 0.195 0.289 0.248
20- 40% 0.053 0.180 0.089 0.055
40- 60% 0.037 0.210 0.080 0.039
60-80% 0.032 0.163 0.100 0.034
80- <l00% 0.053 0.238 0.315 0.058
100% 0.005 0.000 0.018 0.005
21
























































































































































































































Table 5: Input Coefficient Estimates from Pooled OLS at the two-digit level
ISIC Rev4 2D Description Firms No. Labor Coef. Capital Coef. Coef. Sum
Man food products 2,066 0.91 0.18 1.09
Man beverages 202 0.79 0.28 1.07
Man textiles 841 0.87 0.14 1.01
Man wearing apparel 1,512 0.85 0.14 1.00
Man leather 859 0.79 0.20 0.99
Man products of wood and cork 1,105 0.94 0.14 1.08
Man paper products 190 0.93 0.19 1.12
Reproduction of recorded media 812 0.93 0.15 1.08
Man chemical products 259 0.98 0.20 1.18
Man pharmaceutical products 39 1.44 -0.13 1.30
Man mbber and plastics products 489 0.89 0.18 1.07
Man other mineral products 1,099 0.97 0.17 1.14
Man basic metals 125 0.96 0.13 1.09
Man fabricated metal products 3,022 0.94 0.15 1.09
Man electronic products 76 0.97 0.11 1.09
Man electrical equipment 228 1.01 0.10 1.11
Man machinery and equipment 583 0.94 0.13 1.07
Man motor vehicles, trailers 209 0.98 0.11 1.10
Man other transport equipment 49 0.89 0.07 0.96
Man furniture 924 0.98 0.11 1.09
Other manufacturing 513 0.93 0.11 1.04
Repair & installation machinery 687 1.02 0.12 1.14
Averages weighted by number of firms 0.92 0.15 1.08
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Table 6: Input Coefficient Estimates from Pooled OLS at the three-digit level
1
Sector Firms Labor Capital Sum
101 205 0.92 0.15 1.07 242 12 1.29 -0.01 1.28
102 60 0.80 0.18 0.98 243 18 1.01 0.15 1.16
103 76 0.88 0.20 1.08 244 32 0.96 0.12 1.08
104 61 0.97 0.15 1.12 245 63 0.96 0.10 1.06
105 05 1.04 0.16 1.20 251 1,337 1.01 0.12 1.14
106 41 0.99 0.19 1.18 252 50 0.95 0.13 1.08
107 ,343 0.99 0.09 1.08 253 10 0.69 0.08 0.77
108 116 0.85 0.21 1.06 255 119 0.98 0.12 1.10
109 59 0.83 0.18 1.01 256 506 0.95 0.13 1.08
110 202 0.79 0.28 1.07 257 505 0.85 0.18 1.03
131 46 0.90 0.01 0.91 259 495 0.91 0.15 1.05
132 79 0.89 0.12 1.01 261 28 1.01 0.03 1.04
133 132 0.74 0.22 0.96 262 12 1.12 0.03 1.14
139 584 0.89 0.14 1.03 263 11 0.97 0.18 1.14
141 ,347 0.84 0.15 0.99 265 25 0.82 0.20 1.01
143 165 0.93 0.09 1.02 271 78 1.00 0.09 1.09
151 90 0.75 0.24 0.99 273 17 1.26 -0.02 1.25
152 769 0.80 0.19 0.99 274 55 1.06 0.10 1.16
161 248 0.98 0.14 1.12 275 32 0.90 0.15 1.05
162 857 0.94 0.15 1.08 279 46 1.21 0.10 1.31
171 12 0.75 0.33 1.08 281 53 0.96 0.12 1.08
172 178 0.91 0.18 1.09 282 226 0.94 0.12 1.06
181 812 0.93 0.15 1.08 283 45 0.98 0.15 1.14
201 54 0.82 033 1.15 284 42 0.86 0.19 1.05
203 62 1.07 0.11 1.L8 289 17 0.95 0.12 1.07
204 75 1.08 0.09 1.17 291 11 1.01 0.13 1.14
205 68 0.95 0.22 1.17 292 76 1.02 0.05 1.07
212 39 1.44 -0.13 1.30 293 22 0.92 0.15 1.07
221 56 1.05 0.05 1.10 301 23 0.89 0.05 0.94
222 433 0.87 0.20 1.07 309 26 0.92 0.11 1.03
231 155 1.20 0.09 1.29 310 924 0.98 0.11 1.09
233 61 0.95 0.21 1.16 321 148 0.98 0.09 1.07
234 121 0.94 0.14 1.08 323 16 0.91 0.27 1.18
235 14 1.25 0.25 1.50 325 174 0.99 0.12 1.11
236 197 0.95 0.18 1.12 329 175 0.90 0.10 1.00
237 523 0.96 0.14 1.11 331 554 1.00 0.11 1.11
239 28 0.70 0.34 1.05 332 133 1.01 0.14 1.15
2
(continues) Weighted Avg. 0.94 0.14 1.08
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Table 7: Input Coefficient Estimates from Fixed Effects at the two-digit level
ISIC Rev4 2D Description Firms No. Labor Coef. Capital Coef. Coef. Sum
Man food products 2,066 0.42 0.05 0.48
Man beverages 202 0.23 0.29 0.53
Man textiles 841 0.56 0.06 0.62
Man wearing apparel 1,512 0.62 0.05 0.67
Man leather 859 0.72 0.10 0.82
Man products of wood and cork 1,105 0.66 0.09 0.74
Man paper products 190 0.53 0.11 0.64
Reproduction of recorded media 812 0.50 0.09 0.59
Man chemical products 259 0.64 0.03 0.66
Man pharmaceutical products 39 0.32 0.12 0.44
Man rubber and plastics products 489 0.71 0.11 0.82
Man other mineral products 1,099 0.71 0.05 0.76
Man basic metals 125 1.09 0.06 1.15
Man fabricated metal products 3,022 0.61 0.07 0.69
Man electronic products 76 1.07 0.13 1.20
Man electrical equipment 228 0.72 0.08 0.79
Man machinery’ and equipment 583 0.58 0.10 0.69
Man motor vehicles, trailers 209 0.49 0.09 0.58
Man other transport equipment 49 1.01 -0.01 1.00
Man ffimiture 924 0.70 0.07 0.76
Other manufacturing 513 0.59 0.05 0.64
Repair & installation machinery 687 0.66 0.06 0.72
Averages (weighted by firm number) 0.61 0.07 0.68
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Table 8: Input Coefficient Estimates from Fixed Effects at the three-digit level
1,3
Sector Firms Labor Capital Sum
101 205 0.48 0.05 0.53 242 12 2.34 -0.49 1.85
102 60 0.56 0.05 0.61 243 18 0.85 0.09 0.94
103 76 0.29 0.00 0.29 244 32 0.52 0.08 0.60
104 61 -0.16 0.02 -0.14 245 63 0.59 0.03 0.63
105 105 0.43 0.19 0.62 251 37 0.68 0.08 0.77
106 41 0.15 0.04 0.19 252 50 0.83 -0.03 0.81
107 1,343 0.51 0.04 0.55 253 10 0.84 -0.06 0.78
108 116 0.37 0.07 0.44 255 119 0.47 0.06 0.52
109 59 0.19 0.15 0.34 256 506 0.56 0.06 0.62
110 202 0.23 0.29 0.53 257 505 0.50 0.06 0.56
131 46 1.26 -0.01 1.25 259 495 0.60 0.09 0.69
132 79 0.33 0.08 0.40 261 28 1.74 -0.04 L70
133 132 0.51 0.00 0.51 262 12 0.79 0.18 0.97
139 584 0.57 0.09 0.66 263 11 0.76 0.26 1.01
141 1,347 0.63 0.05 0.67 265 25 0.79 0.09 0.88
143 165 0.58 0.04 0.62 271 78 0.78 0.02 0.80
151 90 0.73 0.16 0.89 273 17 0.42 0.05 0.47
152 769 0.71 0.09 0.81 274 55 0.41 0.07 0.48
161 248 0.61 0.15 0.75 275 32 0.90 0.18 1.07
162 857 0.66 0.08 0.74 279 46 0.57 0.18 0.75
171 12 1.62 0.12 1.74 281 53 0.19 06 0.26
172 178 0.53 0.11 0.63 282 226 0.52 0.17 0.70
181 812 0.50 0.09 0.59 283 45 0.39 0.05 0.44
201 54 0.59 0.20 0.79 284 42 0.48 -0.01 0.48
203 62 0.38 -0.02 0.36 289 17 0.77 0.04 0.81
204 75 0.75 -0.01 0.74 291 11 0.41 0.14 0.56
205 68 0.58 0.03 0.62 292 76 0.44 0.11 0.55
212 39 0.32 0.12 0.44 293 22 0.52 0.08 0.60
221 56 1.00 0.07 1.07 301 23 1.03 0.04 1.07
222 433 0.68 0.12 0.80 309 26 0.98 -0.12 0.85
231 155 0.93 0.09 1.02 310 924 0.70 0.07 0.76
233 61 0.79 -0.00 0.79 321 148 0.61 0.04 0.65
234 121 0.53 0.01 0.55 323 16 1.00 -0.19 0.81
235 14 0.78 -0.42 0.36 325 174 0.52 0.04 0.56
236 197 0.69 0.06 0.75 329 175 0.61 0.09 0.70
237 523 0.70 0.04 0.75 331 554 0.67 0.06 0.73
239 28 0.29 0.09 0.38 332 133 0.60 0.08 0.68
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Table 9. Correlation of TFP Estimates across Estimators
FE2D FE3D OLS2D OLS3D
FE2D 1.000
FE3D 0.929 1.000
OL2D 0.528 0.494 1.000
OL3D 0.503 0.509 0.972 1.000
Table 10. Summary Statistics of TFP Estimates (FE3D) by Firm Ownership Type
TFP DOM DMNE FOR Total
N 15,580 100 209 15,889
mean -0.024 1.246 1.166 -0.000
sd 0.633 0.965 0.936 0.662
mm -3.687 -1.850 -1.401 -3.687
plO -0.739 0.338 0.156 -0.733
p25 -0.398 0.775 0.547 -0.392
p50 -0.055 1.179 1.080 -0.043
p75 0.339 1.670 1.730 0.363
p90 0.761 2.267 2.351 0.814
max 4.431 6.076 5.367 6.076
Table 11. Distribution of TFP Estimates (FE3D) by Firm Ownership Type
TFP Classes
DOM DMNE FOR Total
J-cn,-4 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
] -4,-2 1 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.004
1-2,01 0.538 0.050 0.08 1 0.529
1 0,2 1 0.454 0.800 0.756 0.460
1 2,41 0.004 0.130 0.153 0.007
1 4, aD[ 0.000 0.020 0.010 0.000
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Graphs by Ownership Type
Figure 4: Non-Parametric Local Polynomial Regressions of Export Intensity on TFP
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